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“Equality gives rise to challenging questions which are not altogether easy 
to answer.” —First words of Frege’s “On Sense and Meaning”1
This paper practises a Naturphi-losophie of language. I treat texts as rocks to examine the linguistic 
forces that constitute them. In other words, this paper is born 
out of a hyper-realist attitude to sense that asserts: what goes 
on in texts should be subject to a “linguistic physics.”2 In 
order to bring out this linguistic physics as fully as possible, 
what follows is devoted to the logic of sense (or, even better, 
the physics of sense3) in monist philosophies. As I shall argue, 
monism forces the philosopher to treat words as one more 
class of body colliding on a surface. This is because the mo-
nist assertion that there is ultimately one thing in existence 
ultimately leads to the materialisation of language (at the 
same time as the linguistification of matter). A lacuna from 
the opening to Badiou’s Logic of Worlds clarifies this point:
1 Gottlieb Frege, “On Sense and Meaning” in Collected Papers on Mathematics, 
Logic and Philosophy, ed. Brian McGuinness (Oxford: Blackwell, 1984), 157.
2 François Zourabichvili, Spinoza: Une physique de la pensée (Paris: puf, 2002), 240.
3 See Joshua Ramey and Daniel Whistler, “The Physics of Sense: Bruno, 
Schelling, Deleuze” in Alain Beaulieu, Edward Kazarian and Julia Sushy-




Today, natural belief [or democratic materialism] is condensed in a 
single statement: There are only bodies and languages. This statement 
is the axiom of contemporary conviction…It is then legitimate to 
counter [it] with a materialist dialectic, if by “materialist dialectic” we 
understand the following statement…There are only bodies and languages, 
except that there are truths.4
There is of course a third option: “there are only bodies.”5 
According to such “monist materialism,” the linguistic is 
reduced to the corporeal; yet, this is a radical materialism 
that Badiou seems loath to mention. In this paper, however, 
I explore the implications of such a corporeal reduction of 
language by focusing on two monisms—Spinoza’s Ethics and 
Schelling’s Identitätsphilosophie.
Such a naturphilosophische approach to monism emerges 
out of previous work in which I began to think through the 
consequences of the speculative turn for the study of lan-
guage and concluded that a physics of divine names may 
well be a helpful way forward.6 That is, my contention is that 
the speculative turn that has recently engulfed continental 
philosophy needs to be thought through in the realm of 
philosophy of language. For while this speculative turn is 
also an anti-linguistic turn,7 it does not thereby foreclose 
philosophical investigation of language altogether. Rather, 
4 Alain Badiou, The Logics of Worlds, trans. Alberto Toscano (London: Con-
tinuum, 2010), 2-4.
5 As well as the variant: “there is only language.” However, as we shall discover 
by the end of the paper, “there are only bodies” and “there is only language” 
turn out to be synonymous.
6 Daniel Whistler, “Language after Philosophy of Nature” in Anthony Paul 
Smith and Daniel Whistler (eds.), After the Postsecular and the Postmodern: New 
Essays in Continental Philosophy of Religion (Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars, 
2010), 335-59.
7 Harman speaks of “this ghetto of human discourse and language and 
power” to which philosophy has confined itself “for the past two hundred 
and twenty years” (in Brassier et al, “Speculative Realism,” Collapse III [2007], 
381) and Meillassoux is likewise concerned with the aporia to which language 
leads (After Finitude, trans. Ray Brassier [London: Continuum, 2008], 6); see 
further, Whistler, “Language after Philosophy of Nature,” 336-9.
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language must pass through the speculative epoché to be 
transformed from a medium that problematizes the very pos-
sibility of philosophy to a regional object of inquiry.8 The task 
is to examine language not as it exists for us, but as it exists in 
itself. The route I take in the present paper—thinking through 
the consequences of monism for a logic of sense—is one way 
of attaining this end. In particular, I delineate a monist logic 
of sense as a means of intervening in debates over religious 
language. Religious language has become a paradigmatic site 
for anxiety over the slippage of signs. Much ink has been spilt 
over theorising the complex ways in which language fails to 
refer in religious discourse: obsessions with the metaphorical, 
analogic and apophatic character of such language merely 
name this anxiety. The present paper pursues an alternative 
path, teasing out a speculative philosophy of religious lan-
guage by means of an analysis of the fate of names for God 
in monist logics of sense.9
My construction of a Naturphilosophie of monist language 
is organised as follows. I begin by considering precedents 
in the critical literature for such an enterprise in the work 
of Warren Montag and François Zourabichvili. Turning to 
Spinoza’s Ethics, in the second section, I approach the lin-
guistic physics it exhibits through, what I dub, the problem 
of improper names. That is, in dialogue with Daniel Barber’s 
recent work on Spinoza, immanence and religion, I argue that 
linguistic practice in the Ethics is illustrated by the identifica-
tion of the names “God,” “substance” and “Nature.” In order 
to make sense of this process of identification, in the third 
section, I take a detour through F.W.J. Schelling’s philoso-
phy of language as presented in his Identitätssystem, before 
returning to Spinoza once again to apply my Schellingian 
results. Spinoza’s identification of names for God is, I sug-
gest, a “Spinoza-effect” to rival the “Carroll-effect” Deleuze 
identifies in The Logic of Sense.
8 See Whistler, “Language after Philosophy of Nature,” 344-5.
9 And to this extent this paper is, very literally, a working out of the project 
for a physics of divine names.
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Part One: Spinoza’s Linguistic Physics
One need not look far in either Spinoza’s works or those of 
his circle in Amsterdam to find evidence of sustained interest 
in language. Balling begins The Light Upon the Candlestick with 
the following remark, “Things are not for words, but words 
for things”10 and goes on to present a damning critique of 
language as impeding knowledge and so plunging mankind 
into “a sea of confusion.”11 Indeed, he remarks, “If we would 
better express things unto another by words and speeches, 
we had need find new words and consequently a whole new 
language: but that would be toil and labour indeed.”12 In the 
end, though, no such replacement language could ever be 
satisfactory, since language is by nature epistemically deficient. 
Spinoza shares this critical attitude. He writes, for example, 
“Words…can be the cause of many and great errors, unless 
we are wary of them…They are only signs of things as they 
are in the imagination, but not as they are in the intellect.”13 
This is why in the ttP Spinoza is so critical of “superstitious 
veneration of the letter…adoring images and pictures, i.e. 
paper and ink, as the word of God.”14 Words, insofar as they 
attempt to designate truths, fall short.
 However, this is not the aspect of Spinoza’s philosophy 
of language on which I concentrate in this paper. My focus is 
not on language insofar as it represents or makes reference 
to truths, but language considered in itself—as an object exist-
ing in its own right with its representative function brack-
eted. This is one of the implications of a Naturphilosophie of 
10 Peter Balling, The Light upon the Candlestick; English translation in W. Sewel, 
The History of the Rise, Increase and Progress of the Christian People called Quak-
ers, vol. 2, 4th ed. (London, 1800), 626.
11 Ibid.
12 Ibid.
13 Benedict Spinoza, Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect in Collected 
Works vol. 1, ed. and trans. Edwin Curley (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1985), 38.
14 Benedict Spinoza, Theological-Political Treatise, ed. and trans. Jonathan Israel 
and Michael Silverthorne (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 164.
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language: words are considered as objects. In the Scholastic 
terminology that Spinoza appropriates, I am here honing in 
on the formal, not objective, reality of language.
That Spinoza himself makes this distinction between the 
formal and objective reality of language is clear from a remark 
he makes to Jarig Jelles: 
If I see a book containing excellent thoughts and beautifully written 
in the hands of a common man and I ask him whence he has such a 
book, and he replies that he has copied it from another book belong-
ing to another common man who could also write beautifully, and so 
on to infinity, he does not satisfy me. For I am asking him not only 
about the form and arrangement of the letters with which alone his 
answer is concerned, but also the thoughts and meaning expressed in 
their arrangement.15
The point is that language exists both as a vehicle which 
expresses “thoughts and meanings,” but also as an object of 
study in its own right in terms of its “form and arrangement.” 
The former constitutes the objective existence of language 
(language as reference); the latter the formal existence of 
language (its materiality).16 Each of these types of existence 
have their own causal chain: hence, “the common man” is 
perfectly correct to identify the cause of the book in terms of 
its material production; however, there is also a causal chain 
of intentions, according to which the author tries to refer to 
concepts or perceptions. Language exists both formally and 
objectively and there is a separate science (a separate causal 
account) for each aspect.
It could be argued that Spinoza’s deployment of the image 
of “the common man” here is polemical: the science of the 
formal existence of language is trivial and hence not worth 
pursuing. Moreover, Spinoza’s works do give the impression 
15 Benedict Spinoza, “Letter 40” in Collected Works, trans. Samuel Shirley 
(Indianapolis: Hackett, 2002), 865-6.
16 The editors in the Shirley edition flag up the difference between “the 
objective reality of a representation” and “its formal reality” in explaining 
the above remark. (Ibid., 866)
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that he never pursues the science of the formal reality of 
language either in an explicit or sustained manner. However, 
two recent commentators (Warren Montag and François 
Zourabichvili) have argued that this impression is mislead-
ing and that Spinoza does indeed engage in the science of 
the formal reality of language or “linguistic physics,” as 
Zourabichvili dubs it.
Montag’s reading of the ttP in Bodies, Masses, Power involves 
Spinoza in precisely such an endeavour. As he insists, for Spi-
noza texts are part of nature: “Scriptura, sive Natura.”17 In other 
words, writing is a physical body and needs to be treated as 
such. Scriptura, sive Natura illustrates “what makes Spinoza… 
the first philosopher explicitly to consider Scripture, that is, 
writing, as a part of nature in its materiality.”18 It is primarily 
for this reason, according to Montag, that Spinoza intervenes 
in the debate over the interpretation of Scripture in the ttP: 
to persuade readers that texts are not merely vehicles for 
conceptual referents, but should be read as entities in their 
own right. Spinoza “rejects the quest for the supertextual”19 
or, as Montag puts it more fully, “Writing, whether sacred or 
not, is fundamentally corporeal…Writing is part of nature, a 
body among other bodies, and, if it is effective, ‘moves’ other 
bodies to act or to refrain from action.”20 In short, the ttP 
examines the formal reality of Scripture, ignoring for the 
most part its objective reality. It contributes to the Spinozist 
science of the formal reality of language.
Zourabichvili’s Spinoza: Une physique de la pensée explicitly 
takes up the distinction between formal and objective reality 
as the guiding thread to Spinoza’s philosophy. In particular, 
17 Warren Montag, Bodies, Masses, Power: Spinoza and his Contemporaries (Lon-
don: Verso, 1999), 5. It is important to note that Montag conceives such sive 
statements as a form of dialectical identity, where the first term gives way to 
the second. I offer an alternative, non-dialectical reading below (ibid., 4-5).
18 Ibid., 5.
19 Ibid., 6.
20 Ibid., 21. Montag defines superstition as sole concern for the objective 
reality of language: “The superstitious person forsakes the surface (of nature, 
of Scripture) in favour of the depth.” (Ibid., 8)
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Zourabichvili attempts to reconstruct a physics of ideas (the 
laws and structures of thought running parallel to a physics 
of bodies). His book therefore revolves around “the question 
of the formal being of ideas.”21 Indeed, such a “physics cogita-
tive” is noticeably absent in the Ethics itself: the precedence 
Spinoza gives to the attribute of extension in Part II ensures 
that knowledge is discussed only in its objective existence—
insofar as ideas relate to bodies. Curley, for example, takes 
this as a symptom of Spinoza’s Hobbesian temptation to 
reductive materialism.22 Ideas seem to exist to the extent 
that they represent bodies—and Spinoza neglects to sketch 
in any detail how ideas relate to each other: “The Spinozan 
physics of thought is absent.”23 This is the lack Zourabichvili 
addresses. He asks, “What would it be to consider the idea in 
its formal being and thus to relate it to an autonomous field 
of production analogous to that of physics, what would it be 
to conceive a physics cogitative with its own laws (not ones 
merely transposed from the physics of bodies)?”24
For our purposes, the most significant part of his answer to 
this question concerns the incomplete Hebrew Grammar. For 
Zourabichvili, the very idea of a grammar is a transposition of 
this quest for a physics of thought onto the linguistic plane: 
“‘Grammar’ is the name of a linguistic physics, for there is no 
reason not to treat a text as a natural object obeying certain 
laws.”25 The Hebrew Grammar consists in a science of the 
formal reality of language. It is the linguistic complement 
of a physics of thought. Hence, just as in a physics of exten-
sion bodies are formed and in a physics of thought ideas are 
formed, in grammar a text is treated as “an individual formed 
itself from multiple individuals.”26
21 Zourabichvili, Spinoza, 115.
22 Edwin Curley, Behind the Geometrical Method (Princeton: Princeton Uni-







Montag and Zourabichvili’s work provide, then, two pre-
cursors to my argument in this paper. For them as for me, 
Spinoza does indeed engage in a science of the formal real-
ity of language, a linguistic physics or (in my anachronistic 
expression) a Naturphilosophie of language. In what follows, 
I want to pursue this idea in the Ethics itself. That is, I argue 
that the logic underlying much of Spinoza’s rhetoric in the 
Ethics can be formulated in terms of just such a linguistic 
physics. Taking Montag and Zourabichvili’s research as my 
jumping off point, I attempt to fill out in more details just 
what such a physics would look like in detail. In particular, 
it is the deployment of the terms “God,” “substance” and 
“Nature” which orients my attempt to formulate a Spino-
zan “grammar.” As I indicated in my introduction, such an 
enterprise has significant consequences for philosophy of 
religion (as well as for philosophy of language); hence, I begin 
by considering a powerful interpretation of Spinoza’s use of 
these three terms from within contemporary, continental 
philosophy of religion.
Part Two: Naming Immanence with Barber
What follows revolves around two concepts: improper name 
and proper name. Spinoza defines a proper name as follows: 
“By means of a proper substantive noun it is possible to indi-
cate only a single individual, for each and every individual 
has a proper noun for himself only.”27 It is a noun that is suf-
ficient for successfully naming one concept and that concept 
alone (in certain contexts). An improper name can therefore 
be defined as one name that is insufficient for successfully 
naming one concept and that concept alone (in any context). 
These definitions are significant because Spinoza deploys 
more than one name for God; he speaks of “God,” “substance” 
and “Nature” indifferently, giving none priority. If the name 
“God” were a proper name, this rhetorical practice would 
be redundant: there would be little reason to provide more 
27 Spinoza, Hebrew Grammar in Complete Works, 600.
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than one name. Therefore, “God” seems to be employed as an 
improper name: on its own, “God” is insufficient; it stands 
in need of supplementation. Prima facie, this is odd: “God” 
seems to be precisely one of the only names that successfully 
pick out a unique concept. My task therefore is to determine 
how and why “God” can be thought of as an improper name, 
despite all indications to the contrary.
Daniel Barber’s recent essay, “Secularism, Immanence and 
the Philosophy of Religion,” makes use of the impropriety 
of the Spinozan name “God” in order to reinterpret the no-
tion of the secular. The secular has, of course, come under 
criticism in the last decade owing to the imperialist nature 
of its historical manifestations: everything particular in 
religious traditions has been forced, the argument goes, to 
be translated or mediated through the universal language of 
secularity. The secular is a transcendent plane that is imposed 
on the specificity of religions. Therefore, Barber echoes the 
call made by all postsecular thinkers:
What must be expelled is what has been installed [by imperial secular-
ity]: a transcendent, universal plane…The capacity to think without 
a transcendent plane must be pursued. It is in this sense, and in this 
sense alone, that philosophy of religion must become secular.28
Yet, there is an obvious difference that emerges here between 
Barber and postsecular thinking: while the latter calls for 
the elimination of the secular tout court, Barber demands a 
reinterpretation of the secular as an immanent, and not tran-
scendent, plane.29 And he achieves this end of articulating an 
28 Daniel Barber, “Secularism, Immanence and the Philosophy of Religion” 
in Smith and Whistler (eds.), After the Postsecular and the Postmodern, 161-2. 
A fuller statement of Barber’s arguments can be found in On Diaspora: 
Christianity, Religion and Secularity (Eugene, OR: Cascade, 2011). Here, his 
affirmation of the secular is less fulsome.
29 That such a reinterpretation is possible and that postsecular thinkers have 
therefore foreclosed this alternative by moving too quickly is the wager of 
Barber’s essay: “I will argue for a secularity that is intrinsic to immanence. 
Only the rigour of immanence provides the possibility of a secularity that 
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immanent secular via Spinoza. Barber argues that there are 
a number of “paradoxes” in Spinoza’s thought which shed 
light on how immanent secularity would function: they are 
“paradoxes that harbour the potentiality for the sort of im-
manent secularity and immanent affirmation of religion I 
am proposing.”30 The first paradox takes up Spinoza’s claim: 
“Deus sive Natura.” In complete opposition to the philosophical 
tradition as well as common sense, Spinoza identifies God 
and nature—these two names refer henceforth to the same 
thing. In Barber’s words,
[God or Nature] is, of course, a notoriously enigmatic statement. Is it 
that these two terms are reversible, where they name the same thing 
but from different vantages? Is the distinction between these terms 
meant to preserve a real difference in signification, or is the distinc-
tion primarily strategic, in which only one terms designates the real 
(the other then being strategically preserved yet remaining ultimately 
derivative or epiphenomenal with respect to the real)?31
The problem is merely compounded when one adds “substance” 
to the mix, since substance is another name Spinoza employs 
synonymously with God and nature. Spinoza therefore has 
three names which each seem perfectly appropriate ways of 
referring to one thing (i.e. that thing which is referred to by 
the names “God,” “nature” or “substance;” I will henceforth 
call it, following Barber, immanence). Immanence has three 
equally good names; this, then, is Barber’s formulation of the 
problem of improper names.
2.1 The Second Solution
In the above quotation, Barber gives two unsuccessful solu-
has nothing to do with a transcendent plane. I will argue, furthermore, that 
an immanent secularity provides a new way of thinking about religion” 
(Barber, “Secularism, Immanence and the Philosophy of Religion,” 162).
30 Ibid.
31 Ibid.
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tions for justifying the impropriety of Spinozan names. These 
alternatives exhaust most traditional responses to the problem; 
however, as Barber rightly asserts, both of them ultimately fail. 
According to the second alternative, only one of the names 
is really adequate to immanence or “designates the real” (in 
Barber’s words). The other two names are inadequate, and 
employed merely for strategic reasons. For example, “God” 
might be taken as a merely strategic name which Spinoza 
thinks is inadequate to refer to immanence, but that is still 
used in the Ethics as a cover for his atheism. In short, Spinoza 
could think that only one of “substance” or “Nature” is an 
adequate name for immanence; if this is so, the problem of 
improper names would be dissolved, because actually Spinoza 
would be committed to the claim that esoterically “substance” 
(for example) is the proper name for immanence.
However, the problem is that there is no sufficient warrant 
for choosing any one of the three names: Spinoza never makes 
clear which name he prefers. There is no evidence nor even 
any criterion on which to make the choice; hence, any choice 
would ultimately be arbitrary—deciding the undecidable, 
even. For example, to write off “God” as a strategic cover for 
Spinoza’s genuine thought seems implausible considering 
Spinoza’s strident defence of his theism in his letters.32 At no 
point does Spinoza ever let his guard down to reveal himself 
an atheist; to call him one, then, is mere guesswork. Indeed, 
despite Leo Strauss’ fame for jettisoning the linguistic surface 
of Spinoza’s text in the name of a hidden meaning, even he 
is suspicious of writing off “God” in the Ethics as a strategic 
cover or “appeasive term.”33 There is no way of discriminat-
ing between “God,” “Nature and “substance” as names for 
immanence. Hence, Barber speaks of “the inadequacy of a 
reductive interpretation of Spinoza’s act of naming.”34
32 See, for example, Spinoza, “Letter 43” in Complete Works, 879-81.
33 Leo Strauss, Persecution and the Art of Writing (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1988), 188-90. He insists that prior to any judgment on this matter, 
“one has to see whether there are not anywhere in Spinoza’s writings indica-
tions, however subtle, of a strictly atheist beginning or approach” (ibid., 189).
34 Barber, On Diaspora, 3. He continues, “If God is ‘really’ meant to signify 
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2.2 The First Solution
There is another option considered in the above quotation. 
On this alternative, each name refers to immanence, but the 
different connotations (or Fregean “senses”) of each name 
means that they all add something to our idea of immanence. 
“Substance,” “God” and “Nature,” that is, all give a different 
perspective or “vantage” on what immanence is, and so cu-
mulatively such perspectives define it completely. On this 
view, each name refers successfully but incompletely (or in-
adequately)—and this is why they require supplementation 
by each other. This is a version of the claim that each name 
expresses an attribute of God—an argument that Spinoza 
himself employs when it comes to human names (specifically, 
“Jacob” and “Israel”).35
Barber concludes that this alternative cannot be correct 
either. This is because, for Barber, no name can success-
fully refer to immanence, because ultimately immanence 
is “nameless immanence;” it is that which forever eludes 
signification. If “substance,” “God” and “Nature” fail to refer 
to immanence (which is inevitable, according to Barber), 
then they are unlikely to successfully connote aspects of it, 
however incompletely. Barber’s argument thus makes use of 
a central concept in his essay—nameless immanence. 
Another way of problematizing this supposed solution is to 
be found in Spinoza’s definition of adequacy in Part II of the 
Ethics: “By adequate idea I understand an idea which, insofar 
as it is considered in itself, without relation to an object, has 
all the properties or intrinsic denominations of a true idea. 
I say intrinsic to exclude what is extrinsic, namely, the agree-
Nature, what does it mean that God is nonetheless invoked as sign?” (ibid., 4).
35 “You want me to explain by example—though it is not at all necessary—
how one and the same thing can be signified by two names…By ‘Israel’ I 
mean the third patriarch; by ‘Jacob’ I mean that same person, the latter name 
being given to him because he seized his brother’s heel.” Spinoza, “Letter 
9” in Complete Works, 783. On the relation of God’s attributes to names, see 
Gillian Howie, Deleuze and Spinoza: Aura of Expressionism (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave, 2002), 29-36.
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ment of the idea with its object.”36 An adequate idea, Spinoza 
insists, has nothing to do with the success or failure of its 
reference;37 rather, adequacy is the intrinsic aspect of truth—
and this intrinsic aspect is synonymous with completeness.38 
An adequate idea is “absolute.”39 This distinction between 
intrinsic and true maps precisely onto the distinction al-
ready made between formal and objective reality: “adequacy” 
therefore indicates an excellence of formal reality.40 Two 
further premises are required for this argument to function. 
First, Spinoza’s presentation of his philosophy in the Ethics 
is adequate. This remains a controversial point considering 
Spinoza’s sometimes negative views on language (discussed 
earlier). For example, Savan argues, “Spinoza’s views on words 
and language make it impossible for him to hold that his 
writings (or anyone else’s) can be a direct or literal exposi-
tion of philosophical truth.” He continues, “So sharply does 
Spinoza separate words from adequate ideas that it is difficult 
to make out for language any useful philosophical function 
at all.”41 Nevertheless, I contend the above claim must be true 
to some extent for Spinoza to claim to be communicating the 
truth, and so for present purposes I will assume that Spinoza 
did think his philosophical writings (somehow) expressed 
the truth adequately. Second, a complete idea would contain 
every connotation or “sense” pertaining to its referent—that 
is, a complete or adequate idea would include every possible 
perspective on its subject-matter. From these three premises, it 
follows that each adequate name for immanence is complete 
36 Spinoza, Ethics in Collected Works, IId4.
37 Instead, a “true” idea “must agree with its object.” (Ibid., Ia6)
38 This is the presupposition behind the doctrine of common notions: concepts 
which are legitimately universal and all-encompassing. See ibid., IIp40s1.
39 Ibid., IIp34.
40 Hence, in what follows, I use “adequacy” to denote the formal excellence of 
names and “success” to denote the objective excellence of names, i.e. names 
insofar as they do refer to a concept or percept are successful.
41 David Savan, “Spinoza and Language” in S.P. Kashap (ed), Studies in Spinoza 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972), 239.
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and there is no necessity for it to be further supplemented 
by the addition of further names. And to the extent that any 
one of the names used in the Ethics is adequate, additions 
are redundant: each name is absolute in itself. Therefore, the 
problem of improper names—the problem of the seeming 
redundancy of Spinoza’s proliferation of names for imma-
nence—remains intact.
2.3 Barber’s Answer
Barber himself claims that all three names—“God,” “sub-
stance” and “Nature”—must be improper, because what 
they attempt to name (immanence) is ultimately unname-
able. This unnameability does not, however, lead to mystic 
silence, but an endless proliferation of new but necessarily 
unsuccessful names.
At the heart of his argument stands the claim that immanence 
is nameless;42 in fact, it is unnameable. The reason for this is 
to be found in how Barber characterises the naming process 
itself: to name something is always necessarily to install a 
transcendent plane. Barber writes, if “God” or “Nature” are 
considered proper names, “in each case immanence has been 
subjected to a transcendent plane—but immanence remains 
irreducible to such subjection.”43 To subject immanence to a 
transcendent plane is to falsify it; therefore, immanence—if 
it is to remain immanence—cannot be named.44 Or, to be 
42 Barber, “Secularism, Immanence,” 164.
43 Ibid..
44 What is Philosophy? is of course the source of this claim. Deleuze and Guat-
tari write, “The plane of immanence is like a section of chaos and acts like 
a sieve…Chaos makes chaotic and undoes every consistency in the infinite. 
The problem of philosophy is to acquire a consistency without losing the 
infinite into which thought plunges” (Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, 
What is Philosophy? trans. Graham Burchell and Hugh Tomlinson [London: 
Verso, 1994], 42). In other words, there are three types of thought: chaotic 
thought which is infinite but inconsistent, immanent thought which is 
both infinite and consistent and transcendent thought which is consistent 
but finite. To name immanence is to make it finite; it is to determine it and 
fix it in certain respects—converting an infinite plenitude into something 
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more precise, it cannot be named outside of a fictive register 
in which naming acknowledges its own inadequacy.
Yet, Barber is no less insistent that, even though it is name-
less, immanence still gives rise to an endless proliferation 
of inadequate names. “Signification is necessary”45—it is 
part of the becoming of immanence that it is necessarily 
falsified by signification; or, as Barber himself puts it, “The 
ontological priority of immanence runs into the mediatic 
priority of signification.”46 Hence, though no name ever 
successfully refers to immanence, with immanence comes 
an endless proliferation of names which attempt to do so. 
This proliferation is, dubbed by Barber, the excessiveness 
or surplus of immanence: immanence goes beyond itself by 
generating names which endlessly fail to capture it. So, while 
it is impossible to name immanence, it is also “impossible 
not to name immanence.”47
This is therefore Barber’s solution to the problem of improper 
names. Spinoza employs improper names for God, because 
immanence always necessarily generates more and more 
improper names. Immanence gives rise to “the paradoxical 
necessity of signifying that which has no proper name.”48
2.4 Barber and Apophaticism
At a number of points, Barber strongly distinguishes his 
position from apophaticism. His solution to the problem of 
proper names, he claims, “evade[s] the lure of apophaticism.”49 
This is because, for Barber, apophaticism negates names in 
favour of a nameless transcendent plane. Therefore, while it 
finite and rigid. To name is therefore to install a transcendent plane. This is 
why to name immanence (non-fictively) is to falsify it, and so immanence 
is properly nameless.







may superficially appear that Barber’s strategies in dealing 
with names are apophatic, the result of these strategies is 
profoundly non-apophatic: rather than indicating something 
beyond all immanence which cannot be named because it is 
so other, they indicate something so immanent it cannot be 
named. Thus, Barber continues, “Immanence exceeds signi-
fication not because it belongs to a plane beyond significa-
tion—this would turn immanence into yet another mode of 
transcendence.”50 Immanence does not exist beyond names, 
but logically prior to names (as their transcendental condition).
I am sceptical of this argument for a number of reasons. 
First, negative theologians would agree that their “God” ex-
ists prior to names, as an immanent condition productive of 
names. That is, Barber’s characterisation of apophatic theology 
as installing a transcendent plane is unfair. Second, apophati-
cism denotes a practice, rather than a result—a practice of 
apophasis or negation: one can therefore practice apophati-
cism in the name of immanence, just as happily as one can 
practice apophaticism in the name of transcendence. Henri 
Bergson and Samuel Beckett, for example, are apophatic 
thinkers of immanence.51 Therefore, I characterise Barber’s 
solution to the problem of improper names as apophatic, 
and this is because it shares the defining characteristic of all 
apophaticism: a dissatisfaction with language as such and so 
an overriding concern to negate or show up the inadequacy 
of that language in the name of the nameless. Barber’s central 
claim that immanence is properly nameless and so therefore 
50 Barber, “Secularism, Immanence and the Philosophy of Religion,” Barber 
continues in On Diaspora, “The operation I am tracing here is not identifiable 
with the logic of negative theology. While it is the case that negative theology 
also grapples with the difficulty of naming the nameless, it is equally the 
case that negative theology addresses this difficulty by signifying that the 
object of signification is unsignifiable. Immanence, however, cannot permit 
this strategy, for such a strategy makes the unsignifiable into something that 
transcends signification” (8).
51 On Beckett’s non-theological apophaticism, see my comments on Sandra 
Wynands’ Iconic Spaces: The Dark Theology of Samuel Beckett’s Drama (Indi-
ana: University of Notre Dame Press, 2007) in Literature and Theology 22.4 
(2008): 494-7.
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all names are inadequate is the very claim repeated by all 
apophatic thinkers—theologians or otherwise.52
It is here that I locate my fundamental disagreement 
with Barber’s solution to the problem of improper names 
(at least as this problem is to be found in monistic philoso-
phies). Barber claims that immanence is properly nameless 
because it exists prior to all naming: “Immanence is prior 
to signification,” he claims—and this priority, he goes on to 
specify, is an “ontological priority.”53 As a reading of Spinoza’s 
use of improper names, the disjunction between names and 
nameless immanence is misguided for two reasons. First, for 
a rigorous monist like Spinoza (and, we shall see, the same 
is true for Schelling), immanence is each name. There is no 
ontological priority here, but only ontological identity. In fact, 
the productive monisms of Spinoza and Schelling do away 
with the hierarchy of being altogether—and this hierarchy 
is of course the precondition of being able to claim that 
something is prior to something else.54 For Spinoza, there 
is merely identity. Immanence does not exist before names, 
it only exists as names. In the second half of the paper, I am 
going to explore the metaphysical reasons why this is the 
case; for the moment, however, I merely want to claim that 
in asserting the priority of immanence to its names, Barber 
does not take Spinoza’s monism seriously enough.
Second, if Spinoza wrote the Ethics adequately (see sec-
tion 2.2), then the names he uses in the Ethics, like “God,” 
“substance” and “Nature,” cannot fail to refer to what they 
52 For example, Barber stands in the apophatic tradition when he claims 
that the task for philosophy of religion is to recognise the names of the 
secular “as fictive” (Barber, “Secularism, Immanence,” 169). He writes, “It 
is thus imperative to inhabit that difference between immanence itself and 
the fictions it intrinsically produces” (ibid., 169). Apophaticism is precisely 
the practice by which this difference is recognised and inhabited, for this 
difference represents the inadequacy of all language to capture what is 
properly nameless. See also Barber, On Diaspora, 8.
53 Barber, “Secularism, Immanence,” 163.
54 Martial Gueroult, Spinoza vol. 1 (Paris: Aubier Montaigne, 1968), 299; 
Gilles Deleuze, Expression in Philosophy: Spinoza, trans. Martin Joughin (New 
York: Zone, 1990), Chapter 11.
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intend to refer to. If they were to fail, the whole of the Ethics 
would collapse and become mere wordplay with no genuine 
reference to reality.55 Therefore, for Spinoza’s philosophy to 
function as philosophy (i.e. to make claims about the truth), 
Barber cannot be right—Spinoza’s improper names for im-
manence must actually succeed in naming immanence.
These two reasons indicate that Barber’s solution to the 
problem of improper names cannot be correct in Spinoza’s 
case (although it might be a perfectly good solution more 
generally). Barber is wrong to claim that Spinoza employs 
improper names because they fail to refer. Moreover, just 
as Barber’s solution to this problem fails, so too does every 
apophatic solution, because apophaticism necessarily claims 
that all names fail in some way, shape or form. It is here that 
I am intervening in debates in philosophy of religion: apo-
phaticism is not the answer here, and this is a hard pill for 
continental philosophy of religion to swallow. The natural 
inclination of most continental philosophers of religion is 
to resort to apophatic solutions when there is any kind of 
conundrum concerning language. As soon as a difficulty con-
cerning religious language is raised, the assumption is that 
language is a falsification, because God is other or because 
God transcends human discourse or because language is 
structured by différance and so on. This is one of the reasons 
I am focusing on Spinoza and Schelling here, for they are the 
philosophers most distanced from the apophatic worldview. 
Their uncompromising rationalism—their concern to know 
everything because everything is immanent—means one 
cannot explain away their philosophy of religious language 
apophatically. One of the defining characteristics of such 
kataphatic thought is the excess of names they deploy—one 
name is insufficient for their purposes. Hence, Spinoza uses 
“God,” “substance” and “Nature” synonymously, while Hegel 
speaks almost synonymously of “God,” “the absolute” and 
“Spirit.” My contention is that every apophatic solution—every 
solution premised on the inadequacy of names—fails to ac-
55 It will be seen later in the paper that I need to qualify these claims somewhat.
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count for this plurality of names. Spinoza therefore wakes us 
from our apophatic slumbers: he forces us to look elsewhere, 
re-evaluate the problem of religious language and do philoso-
phy of religion differently. In other words, philosophers of 
religious language have been obsessed with the inadequacy 
of names to the point of ignoring kataphatic deployments 
of language. However, the speculative turn is kataphatic in 
orientation—and much work now needs to be done on ana-
lysing and unpacking the way kataphatic texts signify.
Part Three: Schelling’s Metaphysics of Language
I thus need to approach anew the problem of improper names 
in order to work out what a metaphysics would look like in 
which what is referred to by “God” or “substance” or “Nature” 
is ontologically identical with those names. Through this 
metaphysical inquiry, I hope to show how monists solve the 
problem of improper names. To do this, I now turn to the 
Identitätssystem of F.W.J. Schelling.56 In the Identitätssystem, 
Schelling demonstrates why, on the basis of a productive mo-
nism, God is the name “God” or reality is the name “reality.” 
The metaphysics of Schelling’s Identitätssystem reveals how 
names can be improper.
3.1 Schelling’s Productive Monism Presented in Six Propositions
Proposition One: Immanence has more than one name
Unsurprisingly enough, Schelling gives a plurality of names 
to immanence (or what fundamentally exists in reality). He 
56 For a fuller account of and further justification for the reading of Schelling 
which follows, see Daniel Whistler, Schelling’s Theory of Symbolic Language: Form-
ing the System of Identity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012 forthcoming). 
In this paper, I assume that between 1801 and 1805 Schelling’s work forms a 
self-sufficient whole and that the major works of this period can therefore 
be studied in isolation from the rest of his corpus. The philosophy of this 
period is called, following Schelling’s lead, the Identitätssystem (the system 
of identity), and all of the claims I make about Schelling in what follows are 
meant to apply to the Identitätssystem alone.
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employs these names practically interchangeably through-
out his Identitätssystem. The names include “the absolute,” 
“identity,” “indifference” and “God.” It is not the case that 
Schelling prefers one of these names (for example, “the 
absolute”) and uses the others derivatively or secondarily 
to describe certain properties or attributes of this absolute. 
Each name is an adequate name for what is. There is no ne-
cessity for Schelling to use more than one name, yet he does: 
“God,” “identity,” “indifference,” “reality” and “the absolute” 
are improper names. Why, to ask once again, is Schelling so 
insistent on employing them all?
Proposition Two: Immanence is one
The Identitätssystem effectively commences with Schelling’s 
claim, “Absolute identity is not the cause of the universe, 
but the universe itself.”57 Combating philosophy’s “long 
and profound ignorance about this principle,” Schelling re-
discovers the “true” nature of reality—monism.58 He writes, 
“All that is is, to the extent that it is, One…There is everywhere 
only One Being, only One true Essence.”59 This is, of course, why 
the Identitätssystem is called the Identitätssystem, because all 
of reality is self-identical. Immanence is identical with itself.
Proposition Three: Immanence consists in form and essence
Schelling sees immanence as comprised of two elements—es-
sence and form. While these two elements are utterly identical, 
the philosopher is able to isolate them individually. So, reality 
is in essence indeterminate identity, but it is also necessary 
57 F.W.J. Schelling, Werke, vol. 4, ed. K.F.A. Schelling (Stuttgart: Cotta, 1856-61), 
129; Schelling, Presentation of My System of Philosophy, trans. Michael G. Vater 
in Philosophical Forum 32.4 (2001), 359.
58 Ibid., 129, 359.
59 Ibid., 6:156; Schelling, System of Philosophy in General and of the Philosophy 
of Nature in Particular in Idealism and the Endgame of Theory: Three Esssays, ed. 
and trans. Thomas Pfau (Albany: suny Press, 1994), 153.
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that essence cannot exist without form. Essence always ex-
ists formed—there are no exceptions. There is therefore no 
such thing as unformed immanence; there is no such thing 
as essential identity free from formal identity. Immanence 
is always already determinate. There is no ineffable “behind” 
or “beyond” to what is expressed that never manifests itself; 
there is no hidden transcendence.
Proposition Four: Form produces essence 
Form neither represents nor emanates from essence; instead, 
Schelling conceives of a third model for the form/essence 
relation. The foundation on which Schelling’s alternative 
is built is the principle that formation is inescapable. For 
Schelling, this means that immanence exists by producing 
its own essence through a process of formation. Schellingian 
philosophy conceives essence as excessive: the produced es-
sence is always more than it was prior to production. Determi-
nation is not a prison which stops us reaching what matters 
most; what matters most is in fact first produced in the very 
act of determination. Formation can never be a diminution, 
alienation, distortion or loss of essence. There is a perpetu-
ally excessive surplus of essence.
Proposition Five: Even though all forms express identity, there is 
more than one form
If everything is the same—if Schelling is a monist—how can 
formal identity give rise to the irreducible multiplicity of ev-
eryday life? Schelling insists that form is not singular; there 
is a plurality of formal identities in existence. In other words, 
reality is refracted into multiple instances of identity. This 
is how plurality arises in the Schellingian cosmos. Schelling 
designates these various manifestations of the law of identity 
Darstellungen (or presentations or exhibitions). Every thing and 
every idea is a Darstellung, much like it is a mode for Spinoza.
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Proposition Six: Differentiation is quantitative
What then differentiates these forms? Schelling’s answer is 
classically monist: there is only one substance that comprises 
all there is; the only differentiating attribute is therefore the 
degree to which this substance is instantiated. This is what 
Schelling means when he speaks of “amounts of being”60 or 
“degrees of the absolute,”61 or “different grades of identity.”62 
It is also what Grant means when he speaks of “the quantity 
of identity” each entity possesses for Schelling.63 Two claims 
are therefore central to Schelling’s doctrine of quantitative 
differentiation: first, differentiation is a matter of form, and, 
second, it is a matter of the degree or the excess to which each 
form produces essential identity.
3.2 Schelling’s Theory of Language
Every Darstellung is a construction of reality to a certain inten-
sity; there is therefore a hierarchy of Darstellungen proceed-
ing from those which are maximally productive of identity 
to those which are minimally intense. Schelling once more 
has numerous names for the type of form that exists at the 
top of this hierarchy: “idea” is one name he uses, but for our 
purposes the most pertinent name is “symbol.”
In his Lectures on the Philosophy of Art, Schelling writes. 
“Darstellung of the absolute with absolute indifference of the 
universal and the particular…is possible only symbolically.”64 
The symbol represents the highest, most intense form—it 
stands at the top of the hierarchy: “The symbolic is the 
60 Schelling, Werke, 4:123; Schelling, Presentation, 355.
61 Ibid., 2:64; Schelling, Ideas for a Philosophy of Nature, trans. Errol E. Harris 
and Peter Heath (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988) 48.
62 Schelling, Werke, 4:431.
63 Iain Hamilton Grant, Philosophy of Nature after Schelling (London: Con-
tinuum, 2006), 174.
64 Schelling, Werke, 5:406; Schelling, Philosophy of Art, trans. Douglas W. Stott 
(Minneapolis: Minnesota University Press, 1989), 45.
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absolute in itself.”65 Examples of symbols for Schelling are 
organisms, artworks, philosophy and theology—they are all 
examples of maximally intense productions of reality. Yet, 
Schelling is equally insistent that not all symbols are equally 
intense, because they do not all manifest the identity of real 
and ideal (or matter and idea) to the same extent. That is, 
Schelling conceives the possibility of predominantly real and 
predominantly ideal symbols. The extent to which symbols 
identify real and ideal thus becomes the criterion by which 
to differentiate and assess them. And, in fact, Schelling claims, 
there is only one symbol which identifies the real and the ideal 
fully, and this is symbolic language.
Language, Schelling writes, “is the most appropriate sym-
bol of the absolute or infinite affirmation of God”66: it is an 
absolute Darstellung, so exhibits identity to the maximum 
possible extent. Language is not just an ordinary Darstellung 
(or form of reality), it is not merely one instance of a symbol, 
it is the most intense possible symbol. Schelling argues that 
language is the only symbol which overcomes the real/ideal 
binary, and so it expresses identity to an even greater extent 
than any other symbol. It is the symbol of symbols—the 
“indifference of indifference…the identity of identity.”67 In 
Wanning’s words, “Nothing more intense is possible within 
the Identitätssystem.”68 The fact that language is the only 
symbolic form to fully indifferentiate real and ideal has the 
further consequence that language manifests reality most. To 
describe something in language is to produce it in the most 
intense possible manner. Entities exist most in words. Or 
65 Henry Crabb Robinson, “Schellings Aesthetik” in Ernst Behler, “Schellings 
Ästhetik in der Überlieferung von Henry Crabb Robinson,” Philosophisches 
Jahrbuch 83.1 (1976), 161.
66 Schelling, Werke, 5:483; Schelling, Philosophy of Art, 100.
67 Jochen A. Bär, Sprachreflexion der deutschen Frühromantik: Konzepte zwischen 
Universalpoesie und grammatischem Kosmopolitismus (Berlin: de Gruyter, 
1999), 165.
68 Berbeli Wanning, Konstruktion und Geschichte: Das Identitätsphilosophie als 
Grundlage der Kunstphilosophie bei F.W.J. Schelling (Frankfurt am Main: Haag 
und Herchen, 1988), 166.
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put differently, the reality of an entity is its name. Discourse, 
names and propositions are more than anything else can 
possible be.
Our next question is what does this mean for language—what 
is the structure of a Schellingian name? There is one funda-
mental element to Schellingian symbolic language: “Meaning 
is here simultaneous with being itself, passed over into the 
object itself and one with it.”69 Schelling is committed to an 
absolute identification of meaning and being in symbolic 
language. What a word means is nothing different from what 
it is. Language does not signify something outside itself. It is 
its own meaning. Words do not represent something in the 
world; in fact, there is no outside to words. In short, Schelling 
eliminates signification from symbolic language. Meaning 
does not (even partially) exist separate from being—and so 
no process or activity (including signification) is required 
to transfer from the latter to the former. Language remains 
completely immanent to itself: it is completely self-contained 
and self-sufficient. Signification and reference are no longer 
valid categories. 
If reference is no longer a valid category for understanding 
language, what is? As we have seen, forms are characterised 
by the extent they produce essential identity—and the same 
is true for language. So, production of identity is the goal of 
Schellingian symbolic language; it is what remains after the 
elimination of reference. What matters is not the referent (for 
there is none), but the product. Symbolic language does not 
refer to reality; it produces reality. The rejection of reference 
frees language from correctly or incorrectly representing 
an already existing entity; what is rather at stake is how in-
tensely entities are generated through language. Description 
is replaced with production.
There is a further important consequence: if words produce 
the absolute more or less intensely, then there should be ways 
of increasing the intensity of such production. These modes 
of intensification I dub symbolic practices. Through them, 
Schelling hopes to transform all language into symbolic 
69 Schelling, Werke, 5:411; Schelling, Philosophy of Art, 49.
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language. What we have here is a version of the Romantic 
process of Bildung—what Schelling dubs, “the gradual inten-
sification of all forms,”70 and the symbolic practice required 
to make language symbolic is eclecticism: it is only through 
the eclectic accumulation of names for reality that Schelling 
thinks language (and so discursive practices, like philosophy) 
can become fully symbolic. 
Returning to Schelling’s metaphysics shows why: Schelling 
is a monist with regard to essence: there is one essence to real-
ity, and this essence is identity. In consequence, all sciences 
have essentially the same subject matter—identity. All future 
scientific endeavour will repeat the same essence over and 
over. Scientific progress does not therefore consist in what is 
said, but how it is said. The form of science becomes the crucial 
issue. The Schellingian ideal is a form of philosophy (a lan-
guage) which produces essential identity with the maximum 
possible intensity. This point can be turned reflexively back 
onto Schelling’s own practice: the Identitätssystem merely 
repeats the same essence as all other philosophies. It is when 
it comes to form, Schelling claims, that it is to be set above 
everything else. The Identitätssystem is self-consciously con-
structed around this insight into the centrality of form to the 
philosophical endeavour. This is ultimately the reason why 
Schelling experiments with dialogue (in Bruno) and with the 
more geometrico (most rigorously, in the 1804 System); it is the 
reason why he adopts Spinozist vocabulary, then Platonic 
vocabulary, then theological vocabulary. All these various 
experiments in form are variations on one fundamental 
practice which Schelling thinks will make his system the most 
intense. According to this symbolic practice, all previous sci-
entific discourse is reduced to the status of materials that can 
be appropriated to aid the production of identity. I designate 
this practice, “absolute eclecticism”—that is, the magpie-like 
appropriation of individual concepts and styles from various 
scientific discourses for the sake of producing reality.
70 Schelling, Werke, 5:147; Schelling, On Construction in Philosophy, trans. An-
drew A. Davis and Alexi I. Kukuljevic in Epoché 12.2 (2008), 285.
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In other words, all forms produce identity, but some do 
it better than others; therefore, the task of the thinker is to 
locate the most productive aspects of each science and as-
semble them into a system; the result is a system of identity, 
an Identitätssystem. The thinker must choose anything and 
everything that will intensify her form of discourse and so 
intensify identity. In consequence, impropriety becomes the 
very ideal of science—and the Identitätssystem in particular 
is built on the virtue of impropriety. An improper science 
is one unconcerned with borders between fields, but which 
plunders every science (and every name) equally in order to 
intensify its productivity. It is the reason behind Schelling’s 
appropriation of Platonic language and Spinozist method 
into his philosophy, and—most significantly for this paper—
eclecticism is the reason behind Schelling’s use of improper 
names. “God,” “the absolute,” “identity,” “indifference” are 
names taken from various different discourses and brought 
into the Identitätssystem for the purpose of intensifying the 
philosophical language in which Schelling writes. Improper 
names for God are eclectically appropriated and deployed for 
the sake of a higher level of intensity in the Identitätssystem 
itself. Because Schelling employs improper names, he pro-
duces reality better.71
This long detour into Schelling’s philosophy of language 
therefore helps with the problem of improper names. Two 
conclusions are especially crucial. First, reality is most para-
digmatically a name. What is exists most intensely as a name. 
Second, Schelling demonstrates that a monist must do away 
with reference: referential relations assume some difference 
between word and meaning—and this cannot be the case for 
monists. Adding these claims together leads immediately to the 
conclusion: names for God are God or names for immanence 
are immanence. For monists, whether a name successfully 
refers is a redundant question: the adequacy or inadequacy 
of a name has nothing to do with reference. The apophatic 
71 By which I mean intensively “better” or “better” in the sense of Spinozan 
adequacy, rather than “better” in reference to an external model or archetype.
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contention that names necessarily fail to refer to reality has 
no relevance to the problem of improper names as it occurs 
in Spinoza and Schelling’s philosophy. Instead—leaving 
behind the way apophaticism usually frames the debate—I 
contend that absolute eclecticism provides the model to 
account for improper names: the more names given, the 
more intense scientific language becomes. These names are 
intensive productions of the absolute—and they become 
more intense, the more names are used. The success of the 
productive monism Schelling proposes in his Identitätssystem 
ultimately depends on the plurality of names he incorporates 
into this system. Improper names are, for Schelling, always 
an improvement over proper names, because plurality is 
an intensification. This, then, is Schelling’s solution to the 
problem of improper names.
Part Four: Philosophy of Language for Monists
4.1 Spinoza Revisited
This Schellingian solution illuminates Spinoza’s own employ-
ment of improper names. First, Spinoza’s rigorous commit-
ment to immanence means that there is no such thing as pure 
immanence. Any notion of immanence existing separately 
from its manifestations is false. Just as for Schelling there is 
no essence that is not formed, so too for Spinoza there is no 
substance outside of its modes.72 Immanence does not in any way 
stand above or outside its expressions. Substance is “exhausted” 
in its modes. There is nothing behind the manifestations, for 
they are reality. In consequence, names for God (or substance 
or Nature) do not name something distinct from these names, 
for there is no substance as such or God as such. Immanence 
is fully and completely expressed in its modes—and names 
are modes too. Therefore, immanence is nothing outside of 
these names. Immanence is fully contained in the very names 
72 See Deleuze, Expressionism in Philosophy, 27; Genevieve Lloyd, Spinoza and 
the Ethics (London: Routledge, 1996), 41.
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for immanence. Names are self-sufficient: they need refer to 
nothing outside themselves. So, just like Schelling, Spinoza—as 
a rigorous monist—must eliminate the referential relation 
from his philosophy. “God,” “substance” and “Nature” are 
not referential, so whether they refer to immanence or not 
is just not an issue. There is no such thing as apophaticism 
for Spinoza, since a name cannot fail to refer.
This suggests an answer to the overriding question: if each 
name is a self-sufficient expression of immanence, why the 
need for a plurality of names? For Schelling, while all names 
construct immanence, some do so better than others—and 
the intensity of this construction ultimately depends on the 
number of names appropriated into philosophy (for it is 
through this plurality names are intensified). I contend that 
something like this must be true for Spinoza: the adequacy 
of the names employed in the Ethics depends on their inter-
relations with other names. The more complex the network 
of names, the more adequate the philosophy. So, just like 
Schelling, adding names intensifies philosophical discourse.
Numerous scholars have acknowledged that the Ethics is 
a text in which the meaning of traditional, philosophical 
names are transformed. Rocco Gangle writes, Spinoza “uses 
old terms in new ways such that a new subversive notion is 
created,”73 continuing,
Spinoza consistently employs philosophical terminology that has 
come to possess relatively precise and technical meanings across the 
sedimented histories of ancient philosophy and medieval Scholasti-
cism, yet Spinoza uses these terms in ways that shift or distort their 
traditional senses, imposing unfamiliar meanings…[often] directly 
opposed to the traditional sense.74
Spinoza’s use of “God” is a case in point: Spinoza begins with 
73 Rocco Gangle, “Theology of the Chimera: Spinoza, Immanence, Practice,” 
in Smith and Whistler (eds.), After the Postsecular and the Postmodern, 26.
74 Ibid. See also Zourabichvili, Spinoza, 111-2; Aaron Garrett, Meaning in 
Spinoza’s Method (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), Chapter 6.
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a traditional-looking definition only to demonstrate over the 
first fourteen propositions that logical rigour necessitates 
a new, heterodox understanding of this name. Names are 
mutated by passing through the propositions.
Moreover, and this is the key claim, names are mutated 
by means of the relations they take up in respect to other 
names. Transformation occurs through the continual juxta-
position of different terms; their resulting new relations in 
Spinoza’s philosophical system is what alters their meaning. 
In Gangle’s words,
[A name is a term] whose relational context becomes altered. Its new 
sense is generated not internally or intensively, but externally or 
practically through syntactical and formally deductive connections 
with other terms.75
This is what Gangle (following Zourachbivili) terms “a 
chimerical translation”76: it is a form of alchemy by which 
names are transmuted by mixing, dissolving and colliding 
with other names, in the same way as all modes mix, dissolve 
and collide with each other. Names (as one specific type of 
mode) should not be excluded from this physics (as we have 
seen Zourachbivili and Montag argue). A physics of names is 
just as necessary as a physics of passions.
Hence, Gangle speaks of “a new textual practice of metaphysics”77 
in regard to the Ethics. The results of Spinoza’s philosophy 
are generated on the textual surface: Spinoza’s propositions 
chart the manner in which names collide—and this mapping 
process is named the geometrical method. Gangle thus speaks 
of the geometrical method in terms of topographical maps 
of “peaks and valley floors…or the hubs of a transportation 
75 Gangle, “Theology of the Chimera,” 27. Gangle’s work brings out the 
close relation between the problem of improper names and the problem 





network.”78 Names collide—and the record of these collisions 
is Spinoza’s philosophy.
In short, therefore, Spinoza employs improper names be-
cause only through putting to work a plurality of names can 
their mutation be guaranteed. “God” is an improper name 
because it needs other names (“substance” or “Nature”) in 
order to give rise to the philosophical transformations nec-
essary for adequate philosophy. Spinoza puts a plurality of 
names to work in order to intensify his philosophy: the more 
relations that build up between these names over the course 
of the Ethics (i.e. the different combinations and relations 
envisioned in the propositions), the better the philosophy.
Moreover, the type of relation that holds between different 
names is always, I contend, identity—just as for Schelling. This 
is another consequence of monism: everything is ultimately 
one, therefore the only possible form of relation between 
names is equality. So, the adequacy of Spinoza’s system is 
in fact achieved by means of the successive identifications 
of a plurality of names. As these identifications proliferate, 
Spinozan philosophy intensifies. “God” is not only equal 
to “substance,” it is equal to “Nature” and so “Nature” must 
be equal to “substance.” It is implicitly in this manner that 
Spinoza’s philosophy proceeds over the course of hundreds 
of propositions. And, what is more, this mode of procedure 
is the Spinozist solution to the problem of improper names.79
Armed with these resources, it is time to briefly return to 
Barber’s argument. In opposition to Barber, I maintain that 
immanence does not precede the name; immanence exists 
only as it is expressed in the name. In other words, immanence 
does not presuppose a nameless plane, but rather a textual 
surface on which names collide. Immanence is these names (such 
is the necessary implication of Spinoza’s monism) in their 
78 Gangle, “Theology of the Chimera,” 31.
79 It needs to be kept in mind that I am not arguing that the Holocaust is 
the same as ice cream for a monist (as one critic has recently argued [Conor 
Cunningham, Genealogies of Nihilism (London: Routledge, 2002, 68)]), but 
that the names “Holocaust” and “ice cream” are ultimately identified in an 
ideal monist discourse (see Part Five). The ethical implications of this dif-
ference are substantial.
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constantly complexifying interrelations and identifications. 
The surplus which characterises immanence is generated as 
more and more names are identified (for these identifications 
are the very surplus of immanence). The more improper 
names, the more intensely immanence exists. A philosophy 
of the secular, therefore, must name immanence as much as 
possible: not because we are doomed to fail again and again, 
but because naming intensifies immanence. Names bring 
immanence into being.
4.2 The Logic of Monist Sense
Improper names are involved in a process of indefinite 
identification, where the making identical of one name to 
another gradually intensifies philosophical form, making the 
discourse more and more adequate. This is how names func-
tion once reference is eliminated (as it must be for monists). 
And this is the solution to the problem of improper names: 
the more names are made identical, the better the philosophy.
Let us take one more look at this from a different angle, 
beginning from the standard Fregean picture of language, in 
which all names have both sense and reference. Frege defines 
a name as a word or sign which expresses its sense and desig-
nates its reference. As well as referring, names express—and 
this is the key to unlocking the problem of improper names 
for monists. Once reference is eliminated, what remains is 
expression or sense.80 What is particularly pertinent here is that 
Frege developed this theory precisely through an examination 
of the sorts of cases we have been considering. What is the 
difference, he famously asked, between saying “the morning 
star is the morning star” and “the morning star is the evening 
star?” That is, if “morning star” and “evening star” have the 
same reference, why use two names—what epistemic benefit 
is there in using two names for the same thing rather than 
one? In other words, when reference is redundant, what is 
left of language? As one commentator puts it,
80 Or what Schelling calls “production.”
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If the names corefer, there is no difference in the references of the 
constituents of a=a and a=b…So either they cannot express different 
propositions, or else—and this is the inference Frege drew—what 
determines the proposition…cannot just have to with the structure of 
the [sentence] and the references of its constituent words and phrases.81
In other words, either improper names are useless, because 
they all mean the same thing (by picking out the same 
referent),82 or there is something other than reference at 
stake in language which gives rise to improper names. The 
irreducible remainder—what is left over when reference 
becomes redundant—is sense. As Deleuze emphasises in 
The Logic of Sense, sense is absolutely irreducible to reference, 
for they work according to very different logics. The logic of 
sense is not the logic of truth and falsity.83 For monists (who 
have eliminated reference), names cannot be true or false 
because they can neither succeed nor fail to refer to some-
thing external. Sense works on a completely different model, 
a model of more or less intense expression.84
Monist philosophical texts therefore become surfaces on 
which names intensify their sense. This is what is theorised 
81 Graeme Forbes, “Proper Names” in The Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy vol. 7, 752.
82 “If we were to regard equality as a relation between that which the names 
‘a’ and ‘b’ designate, it would seem that a=b could not differ from a=a” (Frege, 
“On Sense and Meaning,” 157).
83 He writes, “This is the most general problem of the logic of sense: what 
would be the purpose of rising from the domain of truth to the domain of 
sense, if it were only to find between sense and nonsense a relation analo-
gous to the true and the false?” Gilles Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, trans. Mark 
Lester (London: Continuum, 1990), 80.
84 If, as Gabriel has argued, Frege establishes the distinction between sense 
and reference in order to show that “the semantic organisation of meaning, 
i.e. the order of words, is not identical with the ontological order of things” 
(Markus Gabriel, “The Mythological Being of Reflection” in Gabriel and 
Slavoj Žižek, Mythology, Madness and Laughter: Subjectivity in German Ideal-
ism [London: Continuum, 2009], 65), then by eliminating one of the terms 
in this distinction (reference), Spinoza and Schelling reaffirm the identity 
of words and things. Significantly, Frege does consider the possibility of “a 
special term for signs intended to have only sense” (Frege, “On Sense and 
Meaning,” 163)—but his choice, “representation,” does not seem helpful 
for my purposes here.
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in Deleuze’s The Logic of Sense and practiced in Spinoza’s Eth-
ics. The Ethics as a whole is, to quote Deleuze out of context, 
“a machine for the production of incorporeal sense.”85 It is 
a surface on which names connect with each other in order 
to generate more and more intense—so more and more 
adequate—series of propositions. This is the “surface effect” 
which donates philosophical sense. Names “frolic on the 
surface of being, and constitute an endless multiplicity of 
incorporeal beings.”86
Now, as Deleuze makes clear, different texts chart different 
surface effects: each philosophical singularity is generated 
from specific operations on the textual surface. Hence, in 
The Logic of Sense Deleuze describes a specific set of surface 
operations employed by certain philosophers which he dubs, 
the “Carroll effect”:
Sense is always an effect…or, even better, a surface effect, a position ef-
fect and a language effect…It is a product which spreads out over, or 
extends itself the length of, the surface…Such effect, or such a product, 
have usually been designated by a proper and singular name…Thus 
physics speaks of the “Kelvin effect,” of the “Seebeck effect,” of the 
“Zeerman effect,” etc.87
This specific set of operations of the Carroll effect consists 
in paradoxes which give rise to heterogeneous series.
What I have been arguing in this paper is that there is a 
specific “Spinoza effect” which describes the set of operations 
employed by a rigorously monistic philosophy—and this “Spi-
noza effect” is irreducible to the “Carroll effect” described by 
Deleuze. There is ultimately only one operation performed on 
the surface of monistic philosophy—identification. Identifi-
cations proliferate indefinitely, devouring all that is different 
in the name of the same. There can be no contradiction, no 
absurdity, no excess or lack—only a continual and all-devouring 
85 Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, 82.
86 Bréhier, quoted in Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, 8. In short, every name in 




process of identification.88 This is a “Spinoza effect”—a logic 
of sense without paradox, a proliferation of identifications 
on the textual surface of philosophy. The more names, the 
more identifications, the better the philosophy—this is not 
only true for Schellingian absolute eclecticism, it is true for 
all rigorous monists.
Part Five: An “Ideal” Spinoza
In the previous section, I outlined the rudiments of an “ideal” 
Ethics which would read as follows,
Proposition 1 “Substance”
Proposition 2 “Substance” = “God”
Proposition 3 “Substance” = “God” = “Nature”
Proposition 4 “Substance” = “God” = “Nature” = “Banana”
Proposition 5 “Substance” = “God” = “Nature” = “Banana” = “Harry Lime”
This structure would proceed ad infinitum, rather in the man-
ner of the paratacticism analysed in Anti-Oedipus (substance… 
and God…and Nature…).89 It exemplifies the logic of monist 
sense and the deployment of improper names. In this “ideal” 
structure of the Ethics, name after name is identified for the 
sake of philosophical amelioration. However, what becomes 
striking at this point is the discrepancy between this “ideal” 
Ethics and the Ethics Spinoza actually wrote. The Ethics does 
not look like this—and this is because the above logic of 
monist sense is only a partial reconstruction of Spinoza’s 
philosophical rhetoric. There is more going on and there are 
more linguistic forces at play than just the identification of 
names. Spinoza exceeds “the Spinoza effect.”
88 Even if Spinoza is read in terms of parallelism, there can in the end be only 
one series of sense, i.e. the series of propositions of the Ethics itself. This is 
one of the meanings of Spinoza’s claim that everything follows necessarily 
from God’s essence; there are no parallel series of sense.
89 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, 
trans. Robert Hurley et al (London: Continuum, 1984), 6.
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Yet, the above rewriting of the Ethics is not only ideal to 
the extent that it differs from the real Ethics, it is also ideal 
in a second sense. It reconstructs the Ethics by means of one 
ideal, expansive linguistic force alone. In other words, what 
has been under discussion in this paper is merely one ele-
ment of a Spinozist Naturphilosophie of language: the ideal 
force by which more and more names are appropriated into 
relations of identity.90 It corresponds to Negri’s delimitation 
of an “ideal phase” in Spinoza’s thinking (an idealism that 
is not surprising considering the proximity of Spinoza to 
Schelling in this paper).91 Here, we can fully realise the ex-
tent to which the transformation of language into a body has 
reversed itself into a transformation of bodies into language. 
The materialistic reduction of language into a Naturphilosophie 
leads necessarily to the anti-realistic insistence that there is 
nothing outside the name, that names are most real. Perhaps 
Badiou failed to acknowledge the radical materialism in 
which there are just bodies because this turns out not to be 
materialism at all, but linguistic idealism.
It is no surprise that the above structure comes closest to 
being realised at the end of Part V of the Ethics—the fulfilment 
and culmination of Spinoza’s construction of philosophy 
where he embraces monism most fully. Here, indeed, Spinoza’s 
propositions are often little more than a series of equations. 
To take one example, the human subject loves God,92 God loves 
himself93 and these two acts of love are identical: “The mind’s 
intellectual love of God is the very love of God by which God 
loves himself.”94 Such a process of identification culminates 
90 As Žižek points out, expansion and the traversal of plurality are proper to 
monism: “Spinoza, the philosopher of the multitude, is, quite logically, also 
the ultimate monist, the philosopher of the one.” The Puppet and the Dwarf: 
The Perverse Core of Christianity (Boston: MIT Press, 2003), 24.
91 Antonio Negri, The Savage Anomaly: The Power of Spinoza’s Metaphysics and 







in Vp36c: “Insofar as God loves himself, he loves men, and 
consequently God’s love of men and the mind’s intellectual 
love of God are one and the same.”95 Here is how Matheron 
describes this climax to the Ethics:
Subject and object are utterly confused with one another. I love myself 
in God, I love God, God loves himself in me, God loves me. The four 
affirmations are equivalent...The terms of the relation are purely and 
simply identified...[in] the following quadruple equation: our love for 
God = our love for others = God’s love for men = others’ love for us = 
others’ love for God.96
Part V ends in a single series of equations proliferating 
identities.
However, the question of how Spinoza gets to this point 
has not been broached in this paper. This has only been a 
fragment of a linguistic physics: contraction, the realist force 
that counteracts expansion and brings it down to earth is yet 
to be determined. This force resists the infinite process of 
identifications of the ideal Ethics. Exposition of this element 
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95 Spinoza, Ethics, Vp36d.
96 Alexandre Matheron, Individu et communauté chez Spinoza (Paris: Minuit, 
1969), 596-7.
